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Concerns about increasing costs and inter-generational unfairness have made the 
state pension ‘triple lock’ increasingly controversial. However, the popularity of the 
policy with voters (since it was introduced by the coalition government in 2010) 
means that political parties have been reluctant to advocate its abolition. In this 
Brief, the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute explores the merit of the 
criticism the triple lock attracts by considering the policy’s long-term impact on 
state pension outcomes; in short, the triple lock is assessed as a pensions policy, 
not simply a pensioner policy. The analysis places the triple lock within the context 
of the wider operation of the UK state pension system for different age groups, after 
comparing the UK state pension system with those of other developed countries. 
The Brief argues that the triple lock helps to nudge the value of the state pension 
towards the OECD average – albeit arguably far too slowly – and considers, finally, 
other policy options that might mean that the same goal can be achieved in a more 
fiscally sustainable manner.
Background
• Despite having a significantly higher proportion of people aged 65 or over than 
the OECD average (18.1 compared to 16.2 per cent), the UK spends significantly 
less overall on pensioner benefits, including state pensions, than the OECD 
average (5.6 compared to 7.9 per cent of GDP) (OECD, 2015).
• The value of the UK state pension is among the lowest in the developed world, 
contributing to a very low state pension ‘replacement rate’ compared to most 
similar countries.
• The replacement rate signifies the proportion of average earnings which 
different forms of pensions saving and pension-related benefits are equivalent 
to. In the UK, the net replacement rate for mandatory, state-provided pension 
schemes (taking into account lower tax rates on pension income than working-
age earnings) is 29 per cent. This is among the lowest in the developed world 
(the OECD average is 63 per cent) (OECD, 2015).
• The introduction of the ‘single-tier’ state pension (STSP) compounds these 
circumstances by abolishing the state second pension (S2P). While the new 
state pension represents a much higher value than the ‘basic’ state pension 
(BSP) it partially replaces, it is set at a much lower level than many future 
pensioners can expect to have received in combined BSP and S2P awards, 
and is largely equivalent only to the means-tested minimum income guarantee 
(MIG) designed to ensure pensioners do not become impoverished.
• The ‘triple lock’ relates to the annual uprating of the STSP (for people reaching 
state pension age after April 2016) and BSP (for people reaching state pension 
age before April 2016), ensuring that pension awards rise by the higher of 
average earnings growth, the consumer price index (CPI; a measure of price 
inflation) or 2.5 per cent each year. 
• Due to sluggish earnings growth and low inflation since the triple lock was 
introduced by the coalition government in 2010, the 2.5 per cent safety net has 
been called upon more frequently than expected (while working-age benefits 
have generally been frozen or uprated in line with CPI).
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• 62 per cent of the electorate support the triple lock (while 16 per cent are 
opposed); indeed, the policy is popular among all age groups (YouGov, 2017). 
Accordingly, the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats have committed to 
retaining the triple lock for the duration of the next Parliament; at the time of 
writing, however, the Conservative Party has yet to match this commitment.
Criticisms of the triple lock
• Two main criticisms of the triple lock are aired fairly frequently. Firstly, many 
commentators argue that the policy is unaffordable. Secondly, some argue 
that, by privileging current pensioners, the policy is inter-generationally unfair. 
This argument is often made alongside a critique of the recent indexation 
arrangements, noted above, for working-age benefits.
• Both criticisms are unfair. In recent years, if the BSP had been uprated by only a 
‘double lock’ of earnings growth or CPI, it would have cost around only £1 billion 
less per year (House of Commons Library, 2017).
• In 2015/16, for example, the triple-locked BSP cost £68 billion, while a double-
locked BSP would have cost £67.1 billion. It is worth reiterating that, before 
2016/17, the triple lock applied only to the BSP, which is set at a rate far below 
the MIG, that is, the poverty line. 
• It is also worth noting that, despite the triple lock, state pension expenditure 
has somewhat remarkably risen by less than it would have had indexation by 
the retail price index (RPI; an alternative measure of price inflation) continued 
to operate – as it had done before 2010 (House of Commons Library, 2017).
• In 2015/16, for example, a BSP uprated by only RPI would have cost £68.8 billion, 
£800 million more than the BSP uprated by the higher of earnings growth, CPI 
or 2.5 per cent.
• In the long term, depending on future state pension age changes, state pension 
expenditure could rise from around 5.2 to 7 per cent of GDP (House of Commons 
Library, 2017).
• The notion that the triple lock is inter-generationally unfair overlooks the 
impact of the policy on the de facto state pension accrual rate for today’s 
young people. The triple lock should be seen as a pensions policy, not simply 
a pensioner policy; it clearly affects current pensioners, but is also designed to 
modify the functioning of the UK pensions system more generally.
• As detailed below, the triple lock’s greatest impact on the value of the state 
pension will be over the long term, and as such it generally benefits younger 
cohorts far more than current pensioners.
• This impact is particularly important given that today’s young people face 
greater risks in saving for a pension privately due to the shift to individualised 
‘defined contribution’ pensions. Indeed, a higher state pension acts as a saving 
incentive because it means that the funds being put ‘at risk’ in a private pension 
represent a lower proportion of expected retirement income being put at risk.
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The long-term impact of the triple lock
• The most important way of assessing the significance of the ‘triple lock’ – and 
therefore assessing the validity of the various critiques – is to consider how it 
impacts state pension outcomes over time.
• It is clear that, in the short term, the triple lock is likely to be irrelevant. Annual 
earnings growth is expected to be above 2.5 per cent for the forecastable future.
• There will undoubtedly be periods in the decades ahead when annual earnings 
growth falls below 2.5 per cent. However, analysis by the Office for Budget 
Responsibility (OBR, 2017)1 suggests that, over the long term, the triple lock adds 
an average of only 0.34 percentage points to the cost of uprating by earnings or 
inflation alone.
• Today, the full STSP rate represents only 31.4 per cent of average earnings; this 
proportion will be maintained in perpetuity if the rate is indexed against only 
earnings.
• While STSP and BSP rates are not comparable, we can compare STSP to the 
level of the means-tested MIG. In 2010, the MIG represented around 30 per cent 
of average earnings.
• Original analysis undertaken for this Brief (see the Annex for full details) finds 
that, even with the triple lock in place, it will be eleven years (2028) until the 
state pension level surpasses 32 per cent of average earnings, and twenty years 
(2037) before it surpasses 33 per cent.
• It will take eighteen years (2035) for the value of state pension (in relation to 
earnings) to increase by more than 1.4 percentage points, that is, the difference 
between the value of the 2010 MIG and the 2017 STSP rate.
• Despite the triple lock, an individual aged 30 today can expect to receive a state 
pension worth only 35 per cent of average earnings when they retire in 2055.
• Similarly, an individual aged 18 today, retiring in 50 years at the age of 68, can 
expect to receive a state pension worth only 36.4 per cent of average earnings.
• It is clear that, compared to uprating by earnings or inflation alone, while the 
triple lock increases the value of the state pension over time, it does so only 
modestly.  
Analysis
• We should not exaggerate the extent to which today’s pensioners have 
experienced a meaningful increase in state pension outcomes due to the triple 
lock, given that it applies only to the BSP for those retiring before 2016. As 
noted above, the BSP would have risen more quickly had pre-2010 indexation 
arrangements remained in place.
• Moreover, the triple lock has operated at a time of significant cuts to health and 
social care spending, upon which older people are more dependent.
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• The most significant impact of the state pension triple lock has been on the 
balance within welfare spending between pensioner and working-age groups. 
The savings in working-age benefit expenditure since 2010 have been largely 
offset by increases in state pension expenditure (Berry, 2016a).
• However, we should not assume that there is any straightforward trade-off 
between pensioner and working-age benefit expenditure. Some commentators 
have been too quick to accept the logic of the austerity narrative in assuming 
that state pension increases have meant that working-age benefit cuts have 
been more severe as a result. Young people themselves consistently report that 
they believe public spending on older people should be protected (see Berry, 
2016b).
• Since it will take almost 40 years for the full STSP rate to reach 35 per cent of 
average earnings, the long-term impact of the triple lock is relatively minimal. 
In fact, if the UK is to succeed in ‘catching up’ other developed nations in terms 
of state pension replacement rates in the foreseeable future, the 2.5 per cent 
‘lock’ is arguably far too low.
• The impact of the triple lock is more significant when assessed in terms of 
aggregate expenditure, but this is largely because population ageing means the 
state pension caseload is increasing.
Policy options
• Increasing the state pension age is the most obvious way of managing the cost 
of the triple lock, and the implications of population ageing more generally 
– although inequalities in life expectancy must be taken into account in this 
regard.
• The increasing costs could also be alleviated by lowering the 2.5 per cent 
lock to, say, 2 per cent. The triple lock mechanism would therefore operate 
much less frequently. This may be especially appropriate if we were to assume 
(reasonably, perhaps) that earnings growth may continue to be more sluggish 
than forecast by the OBR.
• However, a lower lock would mean that indexation arrangements would 
probably be much less effective in compensating today’s young people for the 
long-term impact of STSP, that is, the loss of S2P awards. 
• Such a move would impact particularly negatively on young people who are less 
likely to be saving privately for a pension due to being self-employed. Moreover, 
a higher state pension incentivises private saving.
• An alternative option would be to increase directly the state pension accrual 
rate, that is, the level of state pension entitlement being accrued for each year 
of National Insurance contributions. At the moment, indexation arrangements 
for state pensions in payment act as a de facto accrual mechanism in a nominal 
‘pay-as-you-go’ system (meaning that the government of the day determines 
retrospectively the value of entitlements when deciding how to uprate the state 
pension).
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• Crucially, accrual rates could be more generous for younger people, meaning 
that the value of the state pension would effectively rise significantly over time, 
but current expenditure would ostensibly be unaffected by current economic 
circumstances.
• However, communicating this system, and its implications, would be difficult, 
especially for young people with very limited pensions knowledge. 
• The abandonment of the pay-as-you-go funding model would also require the 
government to shoulder greater fiscal risks, since it would have less flexibility 
to alter decisions made by previous administrations should unforeseen 
circumstances arise.
• The essential problem with the triple lock is perhaps that it only operates when 
earnings growth is sluggish, when the economy is likely to be experiencing a 
downturn (noting also the impact of downturns on tax revenues). A far more 
sustainable approach to increasing the state pension would be to develop a 
mechanism for over-indexing payments during periods of high or normal 
earnings growth. 
• This mechanism (or, indeed, any mechanism) could be abolished once the UK 
state pension has reached a level comparable to other developed countries.






The value of the state pension 2017-2068 under earnings and ‘triple lock’ 
indexation (£) 
 
 Average weekly 
earnings (AWE) 
State pension value: 
earnings indexation4 
% AWE State pension value: 
triple lock indexation3,4 
% AWE 
2017/18 509(2) 159.55 31.35 159.55 31.35 
2018/19 523 163.90 31.35 163.85 31.35 
2019/20 538 168.80 31.35 168.80 31.35 
2020/21 557 174.50 31.35 174.50 31.35 
2021/22 577 180.80 31.35 180.80 31.35 
2022/23 600 188.05 31.35 188.65 31.45 
2023/24 624 195.55 31.35 196.85 31.55 
2024/25 649 203.35 31.35 205.35 31.65 
2025/26 675 211.50 31.35 214.30 31.76 
2026/27 704 220.60 31.35 224.25 31.86 
2027/28 734 230.10 31.35 234.65 31.97 
2028/29 766 240.00 31.35 245.50 32.07 
2029/30 799 250.30 31.35 256.90 32.17 
2030/31 833 261.05 31.35 268.85 32.28 
2031/32 869 272.30 31.35 281.30 32.38 
2032/33 906 284.00 31.35 294.35 32.49 
2033/34 945 296.20 31.35 308.00 32.60 
2034/35 986 308.95 31.35 322.30 32.70 
2035/36 1028 322.25 31.35 337.25 32.81 
2036/37 1072 336.10 31.35 352.90 32.92 
2037/38 1118 350.55 31.35 369.30 33.02 
2038/39 1166 365.60 31.35 386.40 33.13 
2039/40 1217 381.35 31.35 404.35 33.24 
2040/41 1269 397.70 31.35 423.10 33.35 
2041/42 1323 414.85 31.35 442.75 33.46 
2042/43 1380 432.65 31.35 463.30 33.56 
2043/44 1440 451.25 31.35 484.80 33.67 
2044/45 1502 470.65 31.35 507.30 33.78 
2045/46 1566 490.90 31.35 530.80 33.89 
2046/47 1633 512.00 31.35 555.45 34.00 
2047/48 1704 534.05 31.35 581.20 34.11 
2048/49 1777 557.00 31.35 608.20 34.23 
2049/50 1853 580.95 31.35 636.40 34.34 
2050/51 1933 605.95 31.35 665.95 34.45 
2051/52 2016 632.00 31.35 696.85 34.56 
2052/53 2103 659.15 31.35 729.15 34.67 
2053/54 2193 687.50 31.35 763.00 34.79 
2054/54 2288 717.05 31.35 798.40 34.90 
2055/56 2386 747.90 31.35 835.45 35.01 
2056/57 2489 780.05 31.35 874.20 35.13 
2057/58 2596 813.60 31.35 914.80 35.24 
2058/59 2707 848.58 31.35 957.20 35.36 
2059/60 2824 885.10 31.35 1001.65 35.47 
2060/61 2945 923.15 31.35 1048.10 35.59 
2061/62 3072 962.85 31.35 1096.75 35.71 
2062/63 3204 1004.25 31.35 1147.65 35.82 
2063/64 3342 1047.40 31.35 1200.90 35.94 
2064/65 3485 1092.45 31.35 1256.60 36.06 
2065/66 3635 1139.45 31.35 1314.90 36.17 
2066/67 3791 1188.45 31.35 1375.95 36.29 
2067/68 3954 1239.55 31.35 1439.75 36.41 
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Notes
1. The OBR analysis considered how much the state pension would have increased 
between 1991 and 2021 (the end of its short-term forecast period, as of January 
2017) had the triple lock been in place, compared to earnings indexation (of 
course, earnings indexation was itself not in place for the vast majority of this 
period).
2. The average weekly earnings figure for 2017/18 is from the Office for National 
Statistics’ Labour Market Survey; it refers to average weekly earnings in the 
referent period for state pension uprating, i.e. September 2016. The figure has 
been uprated in line with OBR forecasts: 2.7 per cent, 3 per cent, 3.4 per cent 
and 3.6 per cent, respectively, for the period 2018/19 to 2021/22, and 4.3 per 
cent for 2026/27 onwards. The OBR has not published a forecast for the years 
falling between its short- and long-term forecasts; as such, the analysis assumes 
that the mid-point between its latest short-term forecast and the long-term 
forecast applies.
3. In the absence of an official earnings growth forecast for the period 2022/23 
to 2025/26, the analysis applies the long-term triple lock supplement of 0.34 
percentage points to this period as well as the period from 2026/27 onwards. 
In practice, this supplement is unlikely to take effect during the earlier period; 
the Brief therefore probably over-estimates the long-term impact of the triple 
lock (albeit negligibly).
4. State pension values have been rounded to the nearest 5 pence.
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